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RECENT CASE NOTES
CHATrEL MORTGAGES-MECHANICS'

LIENs-PRIoRrrIEs.-Plaintiff held a mort-

gage on a used automobile and certain household goods, given to secure payment of a debt. The mortgage was duly recorded, and contained no stipulation
concerning repairs. After default in payment, which was to be made in monthly
installments, the mortgagor, without knowledge of the plaintiff mortgagee,
delivered the car to the defendant, who made necessary repairs at the mortgagor's request. The defendant had no actual knowledge of the mortgage in
favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to replevy the car from the defendant,
who claimed a common law lien for his services. Held, for the plaintiff.
Personal Finance Co. of Hammond v,. Fecknoe (Ind. 1940), 24 N. E. (2d) 694.
The case presents the question of the priority between an artisan's common
law lien for repairing an automobile and the lien of a chattel mortgage on said
automobile, duly executed and recorded prior to the making of such repairs.'
The general rule which has always obtained at common law is that a lien prior
in time is prior in right. 2 Because of the policy of the common law to go as
far as possible toward securing to the workman the value of his services,3
certain exceptions to the general rule developed in those cases dealing with a
mechanic's lien subsequent in time. It is significant to note, however, that these
exceptions were always rationalized on doctrines of express or implied consent
of the holder of the lien prior in time.4 The cases are confused as to just what
facts are sufficient to constitute implied consent from the holder of an earlier
lien for its subordination to a lien subsequent in time.
The principal case is the first of its kind that has arisen under the Indiana
Chattel Mortgage Act of 1935.5 The court held the new act merely a restatement of the law as it already existed as to the recording of chattel mortgages, 6
and that it did not preclude a finding of implied consent to take the case out of
the statute. There has been much diversity of opinion with respect to the effect
of chattel mortgage recording statutes, on such a question as is here presented.7
The more general view is that proper recording gives constructive notice to the
world of the mortgagee's claim. 8 But this alone is not conclusive. Such
recording clearly would not preclude the mortgagee from giving express con1 There is a statutory mechanic's lien in Indiana. Ind. Acts 1927, ch. 189,
sec. 1; Acts 1935, ch. 213, sec. 56; Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), secs. 43-S01,
47-552. But the court has held these acts to be merely declaratory of the common
law, and providing additional remedies, but not to preclude a common law lien
from arising. Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co. (1933), 206 Ind. 296, 187 N. E. 3982.
2 Rankin v. Scott (1827), 12 Wheat (25 U. S.) 177.
a Bevan v. Waters (1829), 3 C. & P. 520, 172 Eng. Rep. 529.
4 White v. Smith (1882), 44- N. J. L. 105; Hiscox v. Greenwood (1801), 4
Esp. 174, 170 Eng. Rep. 681.
SInd. Acts 1935, ch. 147, secs. 2, 4; Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. (1939 Supp.),
secs.6 51-502, 51-504.
Helms v. American Sec. Co. of Indiana (Ind. 1939), 22 N. E. (2d) 822.
72 Jones, CHATTEL MORTGAGES (Bowers Ed. 1933), secs. 478a, 478b. See
note, 32 A. L. R. 1005, 88 A. L. R. 1185.
s Whiteside, PrioritiesBetween Chattel Mortgagee or Conditional Seller and
Subsequent Lienors (1925), 10 Corn. L. Quar. 331.
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sent,9 and it would seem that the courts should not be precluded from implying
consent on facts sufficiently clear.
An early exception to the general rule was made in an English case which
gave preference to the lien of a shipwright for repairs, because it was necessary
that the ship be kept in repair so that it might be used to earn money with
which to pay the mortgage debt.10 This holding has been generally followed
where such was the apparent purpose for which the mortgagor was allowed to
retain and use the mortgaged property.1 1
The English case also mentioned the fact that repairs were necessary to
insure preservation of the mortgage security. Some cases have given priority
to the artisan's lien on these grounds alone. 1 2 But this exception should not be
extended beyond cases involving facts very closely analogous to those in which
a seagoing vessel is the mortgaged property, where, regardless of whether or
not use is to be made of the property, the security might be greatly impaired or
totally lost unless repairs are made.13
There is authority for another exception to the general rule where the mortgagee knew of the repairs being made, 1 4 or there was language in the mortgage
indicating that the mortgagor might have repairs made.15 This result has
obtained in the latter situation even where the agreement stipulated that repairs
should be at the mortgagor's expense.16 But these stipulations are ordinarily
a matter of private contract between the parties and, unless they can be held to
constitute express consent, it would seem that a third party should not be
allowed to rely on them as giving implied consent. In some cases the deciding
factor has been whether or not the mortgage was past due, so that the mortgagee
had a right to immediate possession.17
It is, however, difficult to see the
9 Kirkpatrick v. Oil Well Supply Co. (1935), 172 Okla. 248, 49 Pac. (2d) 712.
10 Williams v. Allsup (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. (Eng.) 417, 142 Eng. Rep. 514.
11Watts v. Sweeney (1890), 127 Ind. 116, 26 N. E. 680; Hammond v.
Danielson (1877), 126 Mass. 294; Tucker v. Werner (1892), 21 N. Y. S. 264;
Wolfman Co. v. Eisenberg (1921), 190 N. Y. S. 259; Drummond Carriage Co.
v. Mills (1898), 54 Neb. 417, 74 N. W. 966, 40 L. R. A. 761.
12 Scott v. Delahunt (1872), 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 372.
13 See Broom v. Dale (1815), 109 Miss. 52, 67 So. 659, L. R. A. 1915D, 1146;
Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Orlow (1923), 107 Ohio St. 583, 140 N. E. 306.
Cf. Woodward v. Myers (1895), 15 Ind. App. 42, 43 N. E. 573.
14 Campbell Motor Co. v. Stanfield (1926), 214 Ala. 506, 108 So. 515. But
see Nietzel v. Lawrence (1924), 40 Idaho 26, 231 Pac. 423.
15 Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co. (1933), 206 Ind. 296, 187 N. E. 382;
Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Linsky (1934), 99 Ind. App. 691, 190 N. E.
379; National Bond and Investment Co. v. Haas (1933), 124 Neb. 631, 247 N.
W. 563, 88 A. L. R. 1180. Contra: Struble-Wernecke Motor Co. v. Metropolitan Sec. Corp. (1931), 93 Ind. App. 416, 178 N. E. 460; Overland Automobile Co. of Dallas v. Findlay (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), 234 S. W. 106. Cf. Madison
Remedial Loan Assn. v. Wells (1923), 79 Ind. App. 266, 137 N. E. 769; Hawkes
v. First National Bank of Telluride (1924), 75 Col. 47, 224 Pac. 224; Walker v.
Mathis (1925), 78 Col. 384, 242 Pac. 68.
16Grusin v. Stutz Motor Car Co. (1933), 206 Ind. 296, 187 N. E. 382;
Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Linsky (1934), 99 Ind. App. 691, 190 N. E.
379.
17 Cuneo v. Smith (1925), 251 Mass. 399, 146 N. E. 674; Struble-Wernecke
Motor Co. v. Metropolitan Sec. Corp. (1931), 93 Ind. App. 416, 178 N. E. 460.
Cf. Watts v. Sweeney (1890), 127 Ind. 116, 26 N. E. 680; Woodard v. Meyers
(1895), 15 Ind. App. 42, 43 N. E. 573.
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importance of this distinction in view of the fact that, in either case, the mortgagor's possession is rightful.
The closer question arises where there is a mere retention of possession of
the mortgaged property with permission for its use by the mortgagor, without
additional facts from which consent can be implied.1 8 Some cases have held
the deciding factor to be whether or not the repairs were reasonably necessary
for the continued use of the mortgaged property.' 9 But these facts alone, even
where the nature of the property is such that its use will obviously necessitate
repairs, should not be held to support a finding of implied consent, for such
would lead, in any event, to the unreasonable result of allowing the mortgage
security to be impaired by a use in which the mortgagee has no interest.
The lack of harmony in the cases involving this question makes apparent
that there are strong reasons in policy favoring either side.2 0 But it would
seem that cases giving priority to the subsequent mechanic's lien on such inadequate grounds have ignored the purpose of the recording statutes. Because of
the helpless position of the mortgagee with respect to mortgaged property
retained in the possession of the mortgagor, as is the usual custom, and of the
facilities afforded by the record whereby the repairman can protect himself, it
appears reasonable to place the burden on the repairman to discover if property
delivered to him is encumbered. If such should be the case, he may proceed on
the personal credit of the mortgagor, or secure the mortgagee's express consent
that the mortgage lien be subordinated. A bona fide purchaser from the mortgagor would be unprotected 2 l and it is questionable whether a repairman
should receive more protection.
In view of the extensive use of chattel mortgages at the present time in
financing purchases of automobiles it appears important to protect the security
of the mortgage transaction as much as possible. It is submitted that, in the
light of the recording statute, the principal case is a justifiable limitation on
the doctrine of implied consent as an exception to the general rule that a lien
prior in time is prior in right.
C. D. S.
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Surr TO
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OF

DrvIDENvs.Stockholder brought an action to recover dividends accrued on
cumulative preferred stock. The corporation was completely dominated by its
president, who alone opposed this suit. The other two directors were not made
defendants. The court rendered judgment for the amount of the delinquent
dividends and decreed a contingent payment of dividends so long as the
corporation is possessed of surplus or earnings in profits from which to pay
18 Mortgagee protected: Shaw v. Webb (1915), 131 Tenn. 173, 174 S. W.
273, L. R. A. 1915D, 1141. Artisan protected: Guaranty Security Corporation
v. Brophy (1923), 243 Mass. 597, 137 N. E. 751.
19 Atlas Securities Co. v. Grove (1922), 79 Ind. App. 144, 137 N. E. 570;
Bowen v. Kokomo Omnibus Co. (1927), 87 Ind. App. 245, 161 N. E. 298; Moorhead Motor Co. v. H. D. Walker Auto Co. (1923), 133 Miss. 63, 97 So. 486.
Cf. Broom v. Dale (1815), 109 Miss. 52, 67 So. 659, L. R. A. 1915D, 1146;
Myers v. Neely and Ensor Auto Co. (1923), 143 Md. 107, 121 Ati. 916.
20 Further evidence of the conflict in policy is shown by the variety of treatment which the problem has received in state statutes on the subject. See
I Jones, LIENS (3rd ed. 1914), secs. 749 to 786c.
21 Liver v. Mills (1909), 155 Cal. 459, 101 Pac. 299.

